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INTRODUCTION

Texas courts have not, to date, ruled definitively on the question
of whether or not Texas corporations will be held liable for specific
intent crimes' or for offenses of criminal negligence. Although there
is no viable Texas case authority for either the imposition or disallowance of corporate criminal liability for specific intent crimes or
offenses of criminal negligence, 2 such liability has been imposed for
* Assistant District Attorney, Appellate Section, Bexar County, San Antonio, Texas;
B.A., Brigham Young University; J.D. Honors, B.Y.U. J. Reuben Clark Law School.
1. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 452-53 (1978). Specific intent
crimes include those which require a mens rea, such as an intentional or knowing state of
mind. See id. at 452-53; Comment, Corporate Criminal Liabilityfor Homicide.- The Controversy Flames Anew, 17 CAL. W.L. REV. 465, 467 (1981).
2. Viable case authority would necessarily consist of cases which have been adjudicated
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a wide variety of corporate offenses such as regulatory crimes com3
mitted by a corporation through its agents.
Long before the 1968 publication of Robert W. Hamilton's treatise4 on corporate criminal liability in Texas (or the lack thereof),
Texas has remained the only state that has failed to specifically delineate a corporation's ultimate criminal responsibility. Professor
Hamilton's advocacy of corporate criminal liability culminated in
the production of his own proposed revision of the Texas Penal
Code. It was his conclusion that, theoretically speaking, corporate
criminal liability should be imposed; however, at that time there was
no legislative machinery whereby it could be imposed.' He cited
on review through the entire appellate process up to and including the court of criminal
appeals. It is conceivable that corporate criminal liability for specific intent crimes has been
imposed at the trial level and simply not appealed for precedential review.
3. See Coleman, Is CorporateCriminalLiability Really Necessary4 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 908
(1975) (offenses include violations of economic or regulatory statutes and strict liability offenses). In 1909, the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for modem doctrines
of corporate criminal liability. See New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909) (violation of regulatory offense). In New York Central&
Hudson River Railroad, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Elkins Act, a statute
prohibiting rebates which made corporations liable for the acts of their officers, agents or
employees acting within the scope of their duties. See id at 494 (construing Elkins Act, ch.
708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41 (1976), repealed by PUB. L.
No. 95-473, § 4(b)(c), 92 Stat. 1466 (1978)). The Court specifically stated: "[We see no
good reason why the corporation may not be held responsible for and charged with knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them." Id at
494.
Courts have also had no difficulty holding corporations liable for strict liability offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660 (1975) (violation of federal Food and
Drug Act); United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54 (1909) (violation of statute
regulating olemargarine dealers); Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 246 (8th Cir.
1958) (violation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations).
4. Hamilton, CorporateCriminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEX. L. REV. 60 (1968).
5. See id at 60.
6. See id at 77-85.
7. See id at 66. Hamilton admitted the lack of corporate criminal liability in Texas but
recognized that Texas corporations were not immune from civil penal sanctions. See id at
66 (corporations liable under Texas Antitrust Act, Clean Air Act of Texas, and Texas Business Corporation Act). The basis of Hamilton's philosophical leanings toward the need for
corporate criminal liability appears to flow from the seemingly incongruous difference between civil penal sanctions and strictly criminal sanctions. His analysis is strikingly sound.
Not only is it more difficult to assume jurisdiction over a corporation for purposes of civil
penal sanction than to simply mandate the functionally equivalent criminal sanction, but
also the element of the assignation of "criminal" status to the offending corporation provides
added deterrent effect to any future commission of the crime by the same or any other
corporation. See id at 71-75.
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directly to language from one opinion rendered by a court of civil
appeals which specifically stated that this was a matter upon which
the legislature must first act.
In 1974 the Texas Penal Code was revised, and it included several
of Professor Hamilton's proposed amendments to the Code.9 This
additional statutory authority appears to address directly Professor
Hamilton's concern that prior to 1974, "if a provision of the Texas
Penal Code did not specifically refer to 'corporations,' a corporation
probably could not be prosecuted thereunder."' 0 The statutes also
address Hamilton's further concern that "if a criminal statute [did]
specifically refer to 'corporations,' but provide[d] no procedure by
which fines could be imposed," corporations still could not be prosecuted, for further lack of procedural mechanisms." There now appears to be ample statutory authority for the imposition of corporate
criminal liability in Texas,' 2 although interpreting case law has been
slow to emerge.' 3 Another observation which compels the conclu8. See id at 65 (citing Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1961, writ refd n.r.e.). The Thompson court additionally stated:
It is our view that the matters of which appellant complains are matters which the
Legislature will have to afford relief for, if any relief be afforded. There is no procedure
in the Code of Criminal Procedure whereby a corporation as such, can be prosecuted
for misdemeanor in Texas, and we cannot give our approval to the method employed.
The corporation was never arrested; nor entered an appearance; was tried and convicted 'in absentia,' and we think that such Justice of the Peace Court judgment of
conviction was void.
Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d 274, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1961, writ
refd n.r.e.).
9. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.21 (Vernon 1974) (definitions of "agent" and
"high managerial agent") and id § 7.22 (criminal responsibility of corporation or association) and id.§ 7.23 (criminal responsibility of person acting in behalf of corporation) and id.
§ 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (authorized punishments for corporations) with Hamilton, Corporate CriminalLiability in Texas, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 60, 77 (1968) (definitions of
"agent," "association," and "high managerial agent") andid.at 78 (liability of corporations)
and id.at 82 (liability of persons for conduct in behalf of corporations) and id.at 83
(sentences imposed upon corporations).
10. Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEX. L. REv. 60, 67 (1968).
11. See id at 67.
12. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974) (definition of "per-

son" includes corporation); id § 7.22 (corporation criminally responsible for offense committed by its agent); id § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (authorizes punishments for
corporations adjudged guilty of an offense).
13. Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet.
granted) and Thompson v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 348 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961, writ refd n.r.e.) are virtually the only two cases to have emerged within the last 20
years.
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sion that corporate criminal liability is provided for in Texas, is the
analogous case authority from other states that have based the decision to impose corporate criminal liability for specific intent crimes
and offenses of criminal negligence on statutes similar to those effectuated in Texas in 1974.14
In February of this year the Texarkana Court of Appeals in
Vaughan & Sons v. State'5 reversed the conviction of a corporation
for the offense of criminally negligent homicide on the ground that
corporate criminal liability could not be imposed on a corporation
for an offense as serious as homicide. 6 The facts revealed that two
employees of Vaughan & Sons negligently caused the death of two
individuals in a motor vehicle collision.' 7 Subsequent to the Texarkana Court of Appeals' decision, the state filed a petition for discretionary review with the court of criminal appeals, and recognizing
the significance of the decision, the State's attorney filed a supplemental brief. The petition was granted on June 15, 1983.8 The
forthcoming opinion may set unequivocal precedent concerning the
imposition of corporate criminal liability in criminal negligence
cases. Such precedent would have inevitably strong impact on the
imposition of corporate criminal liability for the commission of specific intent crimes.
II.

INTERPRETATION OF APPLICABLE TEXAS PENAL CODE
PROVISIONS

Four sections of the Texas Penal Code specifically deal with the
imposition of corporate criminal liability: sections 7.21,19 7.22,2°

14. See State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971); Rice
v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1981); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610
S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33
(Mass. 1971); People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State v.
Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks, 520 P.2d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Common-

wealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).

15. Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.w.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet.
granted).
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id at 679.
See id at 677.
See id.at 677.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.21 (Vernon 1974).

20. Id § 7.22.
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1.07(27),21 and 12.51.22 These sections deal with corporate felony
and misdemeanor offenses.23 Section 7.21 contains definitions of the
persons for whose conduct a corporation or association may be held
criminally liable. 24 Section 7.22 actually sets out the criminal responsibility of a corporation or association:
(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting
in behalf of a corporation or association and within the scope of his
office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:
(1)in this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto;
(2) by law other than this code in which a legislative purpose to
impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations plainly
appears; or
(3) by law other than this code for which strict liability is imposed,
unless a legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsibility on
corporations or associations plainly appears.
(b) A corporation is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if
its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or
recklessly tolerated by:
(1) a majority of the board of directors acting in behalf of the corporation or association; or
(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation or
association and within the scope of his office or employment.25
Section 12.51 specifies the appropriate punishment for a corporation
adjudged guilty of an offense.2 6 This punishment varies according

21. Id. § 1.07(27) ("person" includes a corporation).
22. Id. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
23. Specifically, sections 7.21-7.24 are titled: SUBCHAPTER B. CORPORATIONS & AsSOCIATIONS. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 7.21-7.24 (Vernon 1974). Such subtitle would indicate the legislature's intent to directly address the issue of corporate criminal liability and
establish rules for the assignment thereof.
24. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN, § 7.21 (Vernon 1974) (agent and high managerial
agent).
25. Id.§ 7.22 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982-1983). The Practice Commentary of section
7.22 contains an interpretation of the corporate criminal liability statutes by Seth S. Searcy
III and James R. Patterson of the Austin Bar. See Patterson and Searcy 11, PracticeCommentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974). The authors conclude that all evidence of legislative intent points to the imposition of corporate criminal liability for all
grades of crimes including felonious conduct. See id.
26. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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to the severity of the crime. 27
A review of Vaughan & Sons v. State,28 is an invaluable cumulative education to the long line of arguments against the imposition
of corporate criminal liability. The Texarkana court ruled that even
though the statutes so state, the legislature could not have intended
to include corporations within the class of culpable parties because
corporations are unable to formulate "intent" in their "artificial and
soulless" form. 29 This reasoning is patently unpersuasive.3° The
legislature enacted section 7.2231 which specifically applies to corporations. Subsection (b) of section 7.22 imposes criminal responsibility for felony offenses which were "authorized, requested,
commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated," all of which require a form of specific intent. 32 It would thus appear that by the
promulgation of this subsection the legislature intended to extend
27. See id (maximum $20,000 fine for felony, $10,000 for Class A or B misdemeanor,
$2,000 for Class C misdemeanor).
28. 649 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted).
29. See id at 678; see also Commonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Passenger Co., 24 Pa.
C. 25 (1900), reprinted in 48 PirrSa. LEG. J. 42 (corporation cannot be indicted for offenses
involving "element of malice or criminal intent"). But see People v. Rochester Ry. & Light,
Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 104, 88 N.E. 22, 23 (1909) (corporation can be convicted of certain crimes
requiring specific intent). The Rochester Court placed certain limits on a corporation's liability. For example, liability did not attach to crimes that required "personal, malicious
intent and acts so manifestly ultra vires that a corporation could not commit them." See
People v. Rochester Ry. & Light, Co., 195 N.Y. 102, 104, 88 N.E. 22, 23 (1909).
30. The Texarkana court's holding that a prima facie interpretation of the negligent
homicide statute and the Penal Code is insufficient to determine legislative intent, appears
poorly reasoned. It seems axiomatic that statutory law should be given its prima facie interpretation unless the legislature has openly contravened its own writing. See State ex rel.
Vance v. Hatten, 600 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
In Hatten, the court rejected the respondent's argument that "[t]he legislature did not
intend for the statute in question to be given its literal meaning." Id. at 831. A statute, the
court explained, must be interpreted as it is written by the legislature. See id at 830. The
court of criminal appeals favorably cited the maxim stated in Brazos River Authority v. City
of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 109 (Tex. 1961), that: "If Parliament does not mean what it says,
it must say so." The court concluded that: "[i]f this Court were to reach the conclusion by
speculation that the legislature did not intend what it clearly and unambiguously stated, we
would still be without authority to change the specific terms of the statute, where such language is plain and unequivocal." State ex rel. Vance v. Hatten, 600 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980).
31. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974).
32. See id To obtain a conviction for the offense of murder one must find that the
actor specifically intended to cause or knowingly caused the occurrence of the homicide.
See id The same would be true in the case of burglary and other felonies. See id § 31.03
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) ("intent to deprive" owner of property element of theft); see also
id § 20.03 (Vernon 1974) ("intent to abduct" element of kidnapping).
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specific intent criminal liability to corporations.33
Section 7.22(b) does not deal with the misdemeanor offense of
criminally negligent homicide.34 A misdemeanor offense falls under
section 7.22(a), and the person representing the corporation only
need be an "agent" of the corporation. 5 Subsection (a) mandates
that in order to fall under its provisions, the applicable statute must
in some way make a corporation specifically subject to its imposition.3 6 Therefore, in determining whether a corporation can be indicted for criminally negligent homicide, section 19.07 of the penal
code must be examined. Section 19.07 provides:
(a) Aperson commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence.
37
(b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor.
Thus, to fall under section 7.22(a) the corporation would have to be
made subject to section 19.07 somewhere in the Penal Code.38 This
has been done under section 1.07(a)(27) which contains the definitions of terms used in the Penal Code:
33. See Patterson and Searcy III, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22
(Vernon 1974).
Under accepted principles of complicity and conspiracy law, entities may be held criminally responsible for virtually every type of offense in this code, including such personal
crimes as murder and rape. . . . Subsection (b) is designed to ensure that felonious
conduct really does represent the entity's conscious policy [before criminal liability is
allowed to attach].
Id. (emphasis added).
34. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
35. See id. § 7.22(a) (Vernon 1974) (refers to offense generally, thereby implying misdemeanor offenses).
36. See id.
(a) If conduct constituting an offense is performed by an agent acting in behalf of a
corporation or association and within the scope of his office or employment, the corporation or association is criminally responsible for an offense defined:
(1) in this code where corporations and associations are made subject thereto;
(2) by law other than this code in which a legislative purpose to impose criminal
responsibility on corporations or associations plainly appears; or
(3) by law other than this code for which strict liability is imposed, unless a legislative purpose not to impose criminal responsibility on corporations or associations
plainly appears.
Id.
37. Id. § 19.07 (emphasis added).
38. See id. § 7.22(a).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

7

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:231

(a) In this code:
(27) "Person" means an individual, corporation, or association. 39

Placing emphasis on two points, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
in Vaughan & Sons held that a corporation cannot be liable for
homicide because the legislature intended that whoever is capable of
committing criminal homicide must also be capable of intent,
knowledge and recklessness.: First, the Vaughan court noted that
section 19 of the Texas Penal Code groups all the degrees of homicide together, including criminally negligent homicide, and second,
that each degree of homicide proscribes the killing of an individual
by a "person."''

On close scrutiny, however, it appears that section

7.22 and other corporate liability statutes cannot be construed to exclude criminal negligence and specific intent offense liability. A
concurrent reading of sections 7.22, 19.07, and 1.07(a)(27)4 2 of the

Penal Code reveals a clear authorization for the return of indictments against corporations or associations involved in specific intent
offenses.4 3 Legislative intent to include corporations and associa-

39. Id. § 1.07(a)(27) (emphasis added).
The term person plays a variety of roles throughout the code. As in prior law, Penal
Code art. 22, it describes whose bodily, property, and other interests are protected. Beyond that, it serves as a general descriptor for operation of the code, identifying, for
example, the actor, the beneficiary of a defense, and the subject of an exception. 'Corporation' was defined in the 1970 proposed code, to include nonprofit corporations .
but the definition was deleted from the enacted code.
Patterson and Searcy III, Practice Commentary, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (Vernon
1974).
40. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1983, pet. granted). The Texarkana Court of Appeals begins its opinion by raising the defendant's argument that the Penal Code provisions for the prosecution of private corporations do not extend to criminal homicide. See id at 678. Initially, the court correctly cites
the general rule that a corporation may be held criminally liable for criminal acts performed
by its agents acting on its own behalf and notes that section 7.22 provides the procedural
device for imposition of criminal responsibility on corporations. See id at 678.
The Texarkana court states that those jurisdictions which have addressed the issue of
corporate criminal liability "[a]re divided as to criminal responsibility for personal crimes
such as homicide and rape, though the majority still agree a corporation cannot commit a
crime requiring specific intent." Id at 678 (emphasis added). For this proposition the court
cites no authority, and indeed no support can be shown, because the overwhelming majority
of case authority is to the contrary. See id at 678.
41. See id at 678-79.
42. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(27), 7.22, 19.07 (Vernon 1974).
43. Cf. State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 690-91 (Idaho
1971) (corporation capable of committing crime involving specific intent); Rice v. Common-
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tions within the Penal Code definition of "person" is specifically evidenced by the addition of these two institutions under the definition
of "person" in the 1974 amendment of the Penal Code. 44
Further evidence of legislative intent to impose specific intent
criminal liability on corporations is seen in the legislature's 1975
amendment of section 1.07(a)(9. 1).4 As has already been noted, the
1974 amendment to the Penal Code added "corporations and associations" to the definition of "person" under section 1.07(27).46
The 1975 amendment went another step further by adding a definition of "corporation," i.e., "nonprofit organizations, professional associations created pursuant to statute, and joint stock companies.
The addition of a definition of "corporation" is significant because
corporations were only defined in the code in the context of a
person.
Another indication of the legislature's intent to impose corporate
criminal liability for specific intent crimes is found in section 12.51
of the Penal Code, 49 entitled: Authorized Punishments for Corporations and Associations. In this section the Texas Legislature provided a separate and specific punishment statute for criminal
offenses committed by corporations and associations." The statute
wealth, 621 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky. 1981) (jury instruction of intent to defraud necessary on
corporate criminal charge); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 941-42
(Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (corporation responsible for crimes involving specific intent); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 78 (Mass. 1971) (knowledge and intent of
agent attributable to corporation's criminal liability); People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385
N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (corporation capable of conviction for criminal
possession of stolen property); State v. Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks, 520
P.2d 900, 904 (Or. Ct. App. 1974) (corporation convicted of promoting gambling and possession of gambling devices); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d
413, 418-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (corporate criminal liability includes crimes involving specific intent); Commonwealth v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, 402 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979) (corporation liable for crimes committed by its agents when acting in proper scope).
44. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07 (a)(27) (Vernon 1974).
45. See id § 1.07 (a)(9.1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
46. See id.§ 1.07 (a)(27) (Vernon 1974). Under the old Penal Code article 22, the definition of "person" did not include corporations-at least when "person" was used in the
accusatory portion of the statute.
47. Id § 1.07(a)(9.1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
48. See id § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974).
49. Id. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
50. See id.Section 12.51 provides:
(a) If a corporation or association is adjudged guilty of an offense that provides a penalty consisting of a fine only, a court may sentence the corporation or association to pay
a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed the fine provided by the offense.
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substitutes fines for imprisonment penalties when the corporation
has committed an offense such as homicide where a conviction normally requires prison time.5 '
In 1977, the legislature amended the statute specifically to address
the issue of a corporation's or association's liability for personal injury.5 2 Section 12.51(c) was amended to include criminal punishment where the corporation or association causedpersonalinjury, or
other loss, through the commission of a felony or a Class A or Class
B misdemeanor.53 It is also important to note that section
12.5 l(b)(1) provides a fine for felony offenses of any category, which
would necessarily include personal injury, violent-crime offenses.54
By specifically including personal injury within this section, it is evident that the legislature intended to hold corporations and associations liable for assaultive type offenses, which are specific intent
crimes."
III.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Case authority from other jurisdictions indicates that in states

which have corporate criminal liability statutes similar to Texas
statutes, it is consistently held that a corporation is liable for specific
(b) If a corporation or association is adjudged guilty of an offense that provides a penalty including imprisonment, or that provides no specific penalty, a court may sentence
the corporation or association to pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to
exceed:
(1) $20,000 if the offense is a felony of any category,(2) $10,000 if the offense is a Class A or Class B misdemeanor; or
(3) $2,000 if the offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
(c) In lieu of the fines authorized by Subsections (a) and (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this section, if a court finds that the corporation or association gained money or property or
caused personal injury, property damage, or other loss through the commission of a
felony or Class A or Class B misdemeanor, the court may sentence the corporation or
association to pay a fine in an amount fixed by the court, not to exceed double the
amount gained or caused by the corporation to be lost, whichever is greater.
(d) In addition to any sentence that may be imposed by this section, a corporation that
has been adjudged guilty of an offense may be ordered by the court to give notice of the
conviction to any person the court deems appropriate. Id (emphasis added).
Id
51. See id § 12.5 1(a), (b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
52. See id. § 12.51(c).
53. See id § 12.51(c).
54. See id § 12.51(c).
55. See id § 12.5 1(c). It is interesting to note that in 1977 the legislature increased the
amount of fine which could be imposed upon corporations or associations, arguably as an
increased deterrent to criminal activity on the part of these organizations. See id § 12.51(c).
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intent crimes and offenses of criminal negligence.
justment

Department CreditBureau,Inc., 57

6

In State v. Ad-

the appellant corporation

contended that "a corporation is not a person as employed in the
criminal statutes and thus cannot be found guilty of a crime unless
specifically provided therein."58 The Supreme Court of Idaho noted
that another Idaho statute5 9 defined certain terms used in the statutes, including the term "person," and that "person" was defined to
include a corporation as well as a natural person. 60 The court found
this concurrent definitional statute to be controlling and held that
corporate criminal liability for the specific intent crime of extortion

could be imposed. 6' The corporation, however, was not liable in

62 The same pothis instance because the jury charge was incorrect.
63
tential statutory construction exists in Texas.
In Commonwealth v. FortnerLP Gas Co., 6 4 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals reversed the circuit court's holding that the statutes did not
authorize the return of an indictment against a corporation for manslaughter. 65 The indictment for manslaughter returned against the
corporation was reinstated.66 In its analysis, the court looked at
three specific areas within its statutory code: first, a statute which
imposed criminal liability upon a corporation or association; 67 second, a general definition of "person" which included corporations

56. See State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971);
Rice v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Ky. 1981); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas
Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 941-43 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
275 N.E.2d 33, 86, 93-94 (Mass. 1971); People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State v. Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks, 520 P.2d 900,
903 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Commonwealth v. McIlwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413,
419-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, 402 A.2d 1050, 105152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
57. 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971).
58. Id. at 691.
59. IDAHO CODE § 73-114 (1973).
60. State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971).
61. See id.at 69 1.
62. See id.at 691.
63. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974) ("person" defined as
"corporation") with IDAHO CODE § 73-114 (1973) ("person" includes corporation).
64. 610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
65. See id at 942-43.
66. See id. at 943.
67. See id at 942; see also Ky. REV. STAT. § 502.050 (1975). Corporate liability in
Kentucky provides:
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or associations; 68 and third, a punishment statute which imposed
criminal liability upon a corporation or association. 69 In light of the
existence of these three statutes, the court held that a corporation
(1) A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of a failure to discharge a specific
duty imposed upon corporations by law; or
(b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, commanded or
wantonly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting
within the scope of his employment in behalf of the corporation; or
(c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation
acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation and:
1. The offense is a misdemeanor or violation; or
2. The offense is one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative
intent to impose such liability on a corporation.
(2) As used in this section:
(a) 'Agent' means any officer, director, servant or employee of the corporation or any
other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(b) 'High managerial agent' means an officer of a corporation or any other agent of a
corporation who has duties of such responsiblity that his conduct reasonably may be
assumed to represent the policy of the corporation.
Id..
68. See Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980); see also Ky. REV. STAT. § 500.080 (1975). "'Person' means human being, and where
appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a
government or governmental authority." KY. REV. STAT. § 500.080 (1975).
69. Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 942 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980);
see also Ky. REV. STAT. § 534.050 (1975).
(1) For an offense defined in this code a corporation convicted of an offense may be
sentenced to pay a fine in an amount not to exceed:
(a) For a felony of any class, $20,000; or
(b) For a Class A misdemeanor, $10,000; or
(c) For a Class B misdemeanor, $5,000; or
(d) For a violation, $500; or
(e) Double the amount of the defendant's gain from commission of the offense,
whichever is the greater.
(2) For an offense defined outside this code for which no special corporate fine is specified, a corporation convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine in an amount
not to exceed:
(a) $20,000, if the offense when committed by an individual has an authorized term
of imprisonment in the penitentiary; or
(b) $10,000, if the offense when committed by an individual has an authorized term
of imprisonment of not less than ninety (90) days nor more than twelve (12) months; or
(c) $5,000, if the offense when committed by an indiviudal has an authorized term of
imprisonment of less than ninety (90) days; or
(d) $500, if the offense when committed by an individual has no authorized term of
imprisonment; or
(e) Double the amount of the defendant's gain from commission of the offense,
whichever is the greater.
(3) For an offense defined outside this code for which a special corporate fine is speci-
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could be liable for manslaughter. 70 The Texas Penal Code contains
almost identical statutes to those which were held to impose corporate criminal liability in Kentucky.7 '
There are a number of additional cases from other jurisdictions
which discuss statutes that are substantially similar to the Texas Penal Code statutes, and which assign corporate criminal liability for
specific intent crimes and offenses of criminal negligence. 72 Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 13 a homicide by vehicle case, contains a discussion of a Pennsylvania penal statute that is
substantially similar to the Texas statute which defines "person"."
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania also discussed another Pennsylvania statute similar to the Texas corporate liability statute.75
More importantly, the Mcllwain court encountered a problem of
statutory construction similar to the problem thought to exist by the
Texarkana Court of Appeals in Vaughan & Sons: the Pennsylvania
homicide statute did not specifically include a corporation as a possible party to the offense.76 In resolving the problem, the Mcllwain
court specifically noted that the Pennsylvania Penal Code defined
fled, a corporation convicted of the offense may be sentenced to pay a fine in the
amount specified in the law that defines the offense.
Id..
70. See Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App.
1980).
71. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974); id. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974
& Supp. 1982-1983); id. § 12.51 (Vernon Supp. 1982- 1983).
72. See Rice v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1981); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971); People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 339
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State v. Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks, 520 P.2d 900
(Or. Ct. App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1979).

73. 423 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
74. See id. at 420. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(27) (Vernon 1974) (person includes "corporation or association") with 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon
1977) (person includes "association or corporation").
75. See Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413, 419-20 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974) (criminal responsibility of corporation) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 307(a), (b) (Purdon 1983) (criminal
liability of corporation).
76. See Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 412, 414 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980); Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1983, pet. granted). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01(a) (Vernon 1974) (negligent
homicide statute does not specifically include term "corporation") with 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3732 (Purdon 1977) ("corporation" not specifically included in homicide by vehicle
statute).
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"person" to include a corporation77 and held that the statutes provided corporate criminal liability for the specific intent crime of
homicide by vehicle.78
In Commonwealth v. JP.Mascaro & Sons,7 9 the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania held that a corporation may be criminally liable for
theft by'deception, deceptive trade practices, and unsworn falsification to authorities.8 0 The court noted that "[tihe circumstances
under which corporations [in Pennsylvania] may be criminally liable are set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. Section 307(a)." 8' The Pennsylvania
statute, subsequently set out by the Superior Court, is almost identical to section 7.22 of the Texas Penal Code:
A corporation may be convicted . ..of an offense if.

.

.(3) the

commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded,
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a
of the corporation within the
high managerial agent acting in behalf
82
employment.
or
office
his
of
scope
The Oregon court of appeals imposed corporate criminal liability
for promoting gambling and for possession of gambling devices in
State v. Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks. s3 The Oregon
court did not address directly the question of whether or not corporate criminal liability could be imposed. Rather, the court merely
assumed the viability of corporate criminal liability and cited as ultimate authority an Oregon statute similar to section 7.22 of the

77. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (Purdon 1977).

78. See Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413, 423 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1980).
79. 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
80. See id at 1051.
81. Id at 1051.
82. Compare 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 307(a) (Purdon 1983) with TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 7.22(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 1974). The pertinent provisions of the Texas statute
provide:
(b) A corporation is criminally responsible for a felony offense only if its commission
was authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by:
(1) a majority of the board of directors acting in behalf of the corporation or
association; or
(2) a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation or association
and within the scope of his office or employment.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.22(b)(1), (2) (Vernon 1974).
83. 520 P.2d 900, 902-04 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
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Texas Penal Code, in a footnote.84
In People v. Lee Myles Corp.,85 the Supreme Court of New York
presumed a corporation's affirmative criminal liability for criminal
possession of stolen property under a penal code section similar to
Texas Penal Code section 7.22.86 Although the case was ultimately
reversed on unrelated grounds, the court assumed the availability of
corporate criminal
liability in order to lay a foundation for subse87
quent analysis.
In Rice v. Commonwealth,88 the Supreme Court of Kentucky outlined a corporation's affirmative criminal liability for theft by deception by setting out the state's corporate liability statute. 89 As in Lee
Myles Corp., the case was reversed on unrelated grounds; 90 however, the court made it clear that corporate criminal liability was a
valid option in Kentucky. 9
In Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 92 the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts held that a corporation could be criminally liable
for the specific intent crimes of bribery and conspiracy. The court
never actually addressed the threshold question of whether such liability could be imposed because the law of corporate criminal liability was already well established in Massachusetts.94 The appellant,
therefore, only raised the issue upon which standard the corporation's criminal liability should be predicated. 95 The court ultimately
84. See id at 903 n.4. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 161.170 (1981) with TEX. PENAL
§ 7.22 (Vernon 1974).
85. 385 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
86. See id. at 340. Compare N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20 (Consol. 1975) with TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974). The New York statute provides in pertinent part:
2. A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
(b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high
managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the
corporation. ...
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20 (Consol. 1975).
87. People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
88. 621 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 1981).
89. See id at 912; see also Ky. REV. STAT. § 502.050 (1975) (corporate liability).
90. See Rice v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Ky. 1981) (improper jury charge
basis of reversal).
91. See id at 912.
92. 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971).
93. See id at 42, 81-82.
94. See id at 71.
95. See id. at 71.
CODE ANN.
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decided that criminal liability could be imposed upon a corporation
based on the "acts of lower echelon corporate officials who have
authority to act on behalf of the corporation. '9 6 In essence, corporate criminal liability was predicated upon a lesser degree of agency
status in the corporation than that proposed by the defendants.97
The defendants specifically argued that corporate criminal liability
can only be imposed if "such conduct was performed, authorized,
. . . or tolerated by the corporations' directors, officers or other
'high managerial agents' who are sufficiently high in the corporate
hierarchy."98 The Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument. 99
The author has found no current viable authority in any jurisdiction that contradicts the foregoing authority.' °° Current cases hold
that in general, if criminal liability is not imposed on a corporation
it is due to a defect in the trial, or a failure to find that the corporation's agent was in fact an
agent, or, as an agent, was acting in the
0'
duty.'
scope of corporate
IV.

V UGHAIN & SONS INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER

JURISDICTIONS

In Vaughan & Sons, the Texarkana court noted cases from other
jurisdictions which have imposed criminal liability upon corporations for lesser degrees of homicide.'0 2 It is evident that the Texar96. Id at 84.
97. See id at 83-84.
98. Id. at 71.

99. See id at 84. Under defendant's standard, it would be difficult to obtain a conviction because "top executives do not carry out the overt criminal acts." Id at 84.
100. Three other less related but supportive cases from other states also utilize statutes
similar to section 7.22 of the Texas Penal Code to assign corporate criminal liability for the
violation of regulatory statutes. See United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d
Cir. 1981) (violation of Sherman Act); People v. White Bros. Equip. Co., 380 N.E.2d 396,
398-99 (I11. App. Ct. 1978) (absolute liability for operating motor vehicle under fraudulent
permit); People v. Aquarian Age 2000, Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547-48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(operating chain distributor scheme).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also rendered a decision containing a comprehensive discussion of the analogous agency and tort law aspects of corporate criminal
liability. See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33, 71-94 (Mass. 197 1).
101. See State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971)
(jury instruction contained incorrect statement of law); State v. Chapman Dodge Center,
Inc., 428 So. 2d 413, 419 (La. 1983) (insufficient evidence to support conclusion that agent
committed crime while acting within scope of employment).
102. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983,
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kana court conceded a recognition of these cases which hold
corporations criminally liable for offenses of criminal negligence rising to the level of homicide. The court noted that, "[m]any State
Courts have, however, shown a tendency to enlarge on the criminal
liability of corporations by holding them responsible for the lesser
degrees of homicide."'' 0 3 Without treating this confficting authority,
the court simply stated that the appellant's offense was a personal
crime and a crime requiring only general intent.' 14 The court apparently rejected the analogous authority which appeared to be onpoint for Vaughan's offense, criminally negligent homicide, a misdemeanor, and which falls directly into the category of "lesser degrees
of homicide."105
The Texarkana court agreed that a superficial reading of the negligent homicide statute and the Penal Code definition of "person"
would allow a corporation to be found liable for criminally negligent homicide, but concluded that it could find noplain legislative
intent to impose corporate criminal liability.' 6 As has been discussed, there is sufficientplain or clear statutory law and analogous
case authority upon which to base an imposition of corporate criminal liability, and it would appear that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, the legislature presumably "meant what it said."'0 7
Another central theory upon which the Texarkana court based its
denial of corporate criminal liability was the notion that "Iflor more
serious offenses guilt is personal and not vicarious."' 1 8 The authorpet. granted); see also State v. LeHigh Valley Ry. Co., 103 A. 685, 685-86 (N.J. 1917) (corporation criminally liable for manslaughter); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines,
Inc., 423 A.2d 413, 423 (Pa. 1980) (corporation criminally liable for homicide by vehicle).
103. Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet.
granted).
104. See id at 678.
105. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 19.01 (Vernon 1974) (homicide includes criminally
negligent homicide).
106. Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet.
granted).
107. See State ex. rel. Vance v. Hatten, 600 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(unambiguous statutes must be afforded literal meaning); Brazos River Auth. v. City of Graham, 354 S.W.2d 99, 109 (Tex. 1961) (noted maxim that "[i]f Parliament does not mean what
it says, it must say so.").
108. Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983, pet.
granted). In its discussion the court reasoned that: "[lIt is fundamental to our criminal
jurisprudence that for more serious offenses guilt is personal and not vicarious." Id. at 678
(citing 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 26 (1968); Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1117 (1962); 19 C.J.S.
Corporations § 1363 (1940))."
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ity cited for support of this proposition is unpersuasive, as well as
off-point.
The court cited to American Jurisprudence, wherein the author
stated that "[iut is the general rule that a corporation cannot commit
any grade of homicide requiring a specific criminal intent, for the
reason that it cannot formulate such intent."' 0 9 The cases cited as
support for this general conclusion consist of: Commonwealth v.
Punxsutawoney Street Passenger Co. 10 and Rex v. Cory Brothers &
Co. "I Both cases are old, the first one having been decided in 1900.
The second case is a 1927 case from England. A further reading of
the cited American Jurisprudence section reveals that a 1904 case
was used to support the author's further conclusion that "[clourts
have indicated a willingness to hold a corporation liable for homicide resting on negligence," rather than specific intent." 12 The author went on to conclude, however, that liability for negligent
homicide could not attach to a corporation under the line of authority holding that the statutory definition of a "person" does not include a corporation.'
The two cases used to support this
conclusion were rendered in 1909 and 1913 and neither were from
Texas.' l" Furthermore, the author in American Jurisprudencestated:
"[I]t has, however, been said that if the statute is broad enough to
permit the inclusion of artificial persons, there is no objection to the
conviction of a corporation of the lesser degrees of homicide for
which punishment by fine is provided."' 15 Based on the foregoing
examination of the American Jurisprudence section cited by the
Vaughan court, it is clear that this section does not support the
proposition stated in Vaughan & Sons that it is truly "[flundamental
to our criminal jurisprudence that for more serious offenses guilt is

109. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 26 (1968).
110. 24 Pa. C. 25 (1900), reprinted in 48 PITrSB. LEG. J.42.
111. [1927] 1 K.B. 810

112. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 26 (1968) (citing United States v. Schaick, 134 F.
592 (C.C. N.Y. 1904)). It is important to note that this is the type of offense for which
Vaughan & Sons was convicted. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 677 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted) (Vaughan & Sons convicted of criminally negligent
homicide).
113. See 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 26 (1968).
114. See id (citing People v. Rochester R. & Light Co., 195 N.Y. 10, 88 N.E. 22 (1909)
and Commonwealth v. Illinois C.R. Co., 153 S.W.459 (Ky. 1913)).
115. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 26 (1968).
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personal and not 'vicarious.' 1116 It is also apparent that the recent
cases discussed in section III of this article have outdated the case
authority used to support the contentions in American
Jurisprudence.117
The other authority, cited by the Texarkana court for the proposition that criminally negligent homicide liability is personal and not
vicarious,""8 is also unpersuasive. A review of the American Law
Reports Second and Corpus Juris Secundum reveals the same noncommitment to the "lack of personal intent" argument, as well as
the same use of the outdated authority."19 Furthermore, the three
legal sources used by the Texarkana court to support their "personal
not vicarious" conclusion of law should not be used as the basis for
this far-reaching and inconsistent decision which contravenes public
policy interests. 2 Hence, it appears that the Texarkana court's
opinion represents a misapplication of outdated case authorities.
Upon such bedrock, neither law nor public policy should be
predicated.

116. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983,
pet. granted).
117. See State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971);
Rice v. Commonwealth, 621 S.W.2d 911 (Ky. 198 1); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co.,
610 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d
33 (Mass. 1971); People v. Lee Myles Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State
v. Oregon City Elks Lodge No. 1189, BPO Elks, 520 P.2d 900 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, Inc., 423 A.2d 413 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Commonwealth v. J.P. Mascaro & Sons, 402 A.2d 1050 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
118. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1983,
pet. granted) (citing Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1117 (1962); 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1363 (1940)).
119. See Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 1117, 1118-20; 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1363, at 1076
(1940).
120. See Miller, Corporate Criminal Liability: .4 Principle Extended to its Limits, 38

FED. B.J. 49, 51 (1979) (public policy favors corporate criminal liability); Note, Corporate
Homicide. A New Assault on CorporateDecision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911, 922-23

(1979) (criminal prosecution of corporation follows public policy interests of deterrence and
social and moral condemnation of illegal corporate activities); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07
Commentary at 154 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (primary purpose of fining corporation to
encourage managers to supervise corporate personnel closely). Public policy interests in
general deterrence of criminal corporate behavior would be contravened if corporate crimes
are left unpunished and offenders are free to continue their conduct. Cf State v. LeHigh
Valley R.R., 103 A. 685, 686 (N.J. 1917) (corporation should be held accountable for its
illegal acts); People v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 354 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(although corporation cannot be victim of homicide, it can commit the offense and be held
answerable for it).
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One may conclude that the Texarkana court's holding that "[t]he
more serious the offense the more personal the liability," is contrary
to some compelling public policy interests in general or specific deterrence. 12 1 Professor George Fletcher of U.C.L.A. writes that:
"[g]eneral deterrence . . .means . ..the good of punishing one
criminal derives from the likelihood that others will thereby be influenced not to commit the same crime; special deterrence . . .
means that the punished offender will be deterred from future offenses after his release ... .
If it can be hypothesized that the
people of Texas would place importance on the notion that corporations as well as individuals should be deterred from committing
criminally negligent homicide, then it can be concluded that the
more serious the offense the more public policy contrains the assignment of liability.
Unlike German criminal legislation, which does not create consensus, but follows it,' 23 the criminal law in American jurisdictions
has come to be relatively more dependent on the action of legislatures and courts.' 24 This factor, combined with the democratic legislative selection process, allows the current general thinking on
criminal law theory to be manifest in legislative mandate. It appears evident from the authority discussed in section III of this arti121. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (1978). Many highly regarded thinkers and writers have commented on the nature of deterrence. Plato wrote in his
Laws that "[p]unishment is not retribution for the past ... it is imposed for the sake of the
future and to secure that the person punished and those who see him punished may ...
abate much of their old behavior." M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72, 74 (1975) (quot-

ing PLATO, LAWS (xi, 934). Bentham wrote that general deterrence is the "chief end" and

"real justification" of legal punishment. Id Kant reasoned that general deterrence "involves
using the criminal as an instrument." Id
122. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (1978). While Professor Fletcher

maintains that the extent to which deterrence is actually the result of punishment remains
speculative, especially in a specific case, his reservations are more philosophical than practical. See id at 415-18. He is concerned that placing too much stress on issues of "social
protection" may tend to suppress notions ofjustice that only the guilty should suffer conviction and punishment, and secondly, that the degree of punishment should be proportionate
to the crime. See id at 415-16 (discusses historical instances of arbitrary executions in
prison camps and extreme deterrent effects of such "punishment"). It would appear that
arbitrary executions do not technically fit the definition of "punishment." An innocent
prison inmate is not "punished" by being executed, he should be more correctly considered
"murdered" for special organizational purposes.
123. See G.

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 408

(1978).

124. See id at 408.
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cle, that current general thinking on the criminal law theory of
corporate liability is positive across the nation. It would seem appropriate that in an age of increased corporate and technological
sophistication the public would be interested in deterring those corporate activities which are difficult to monitor and which are crimi125
nally contrary to the laws designed to protect the public at large.
There may even exist public policy interests in retribution or rehabilitation for such corporate behavior. 26 But in the case of homicide, it is not rational to expect that the public would wish to adopt
criminal sanctions against only a portion of those corporations
which engage in criminal activity unless the unhampered existence
of the corporate entity is valued more highly than the life of even
one human being.' 27 It appears that public policy interests in deterrence would act to distribute liability to all parties involved, especially in theface of a serious offense, and not to limit its application
because of fear that
some party to the offense would be meted seri28
ous punishment.
Principles of deterrence mandate that offenders be given punishment sufficient to inhibit the commission of such crime by either the
same parties or other persons and corporations, in order to protect
125. See Note, CorporateHomicide. A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54
911, 924 (1979) (deterrence of "reckless disregard for consumer safety"
one justification for corporate criminal liability).
126. It is possible that statutes which impose corporate criminal liability in Texas were
also promulgated with an eye towards notions of contemporary minimalist retribution. This
means that there may be a feeling among the general public that a corporation should be
punished for criminally negligent homicide because it deserves the punishment. M. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 85 (1975). Contemporary minimalist thinking would, however,
also allow a judge to absolve a corporation or lessen punishment if it would serve purposes
of rehabilitation or deterence. See id.
127. This analysis does not reach the economics of the threat of major corporate extinction versus the life of even one individual. Neither does the Texas statute reach this question. No provision is made in the Texas Penal Code for the extinction of a corporate entity
as punishment for a crime of criminal negligence or specific intent.
128. The Texarkana court's apparent concern that a party should not be held liable for
so serious a crime when the crime is committed "[bly someone other than the person
charged," is not a valid one. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 679 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1983, pet. granted). There can be no legitimate concern that the corporation will be meted unjust punishment because it is too amorphous to formulate intent, in
light of the statutory burdens of proof which must be met before corporate liability attaches.
Corporations are amply protected by the statutes which compel a thorough showing of a
corporate agent's "high managerial agency" status, acting in the scope of employment,
before specific intent criminal liability can attach to the corporation. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 7.22 (Vernon 1974).
NOTRE DAME LAW.
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the public from recurrence of the crime.' 29 Limitation of the rational distribution of punishment may therefore be antithetical to
public policy interests in functionally
deterring the commission of
13
0
society.
of
sector
every
in
crime
VI.

CONCLUSION

Corporate criminal liability for specific intent crimes and offenses
of criminal negligence has not yet been imposed in Texas. Up until
the 1974 edition of the Penal Code, no machinery existed whereby
such liability could be assigned. The statutes now contain a procedure for such assignment; however, this procedure has not yet been
interpreted by the court of criminal appeals.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals in Vaughan & Sons based its
decision on the lack of plain legislative intent justifying the imposition of corporate liability and on the proposition that liability for
such a serious offense is personal and not vicarious.' 3 ' Neither basis
for the opinion is persuasive. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
recently granted the State's petition for discretionary review of the
Texarkana court's decision. 132 The high court's decision is likely to
have a heavy impact upon the future assignment of corporate criminal liability for offenses of criminal negligence and will inevitably
determine the direction of corporate criminal liability for specific
intent crimes. It appears that in light of the existence of Penal Code
statutes that provide guidelines for the assignment of corporate
criminal liability, and analogous case law authority from other jurisdictions, as well as public policy interests in general, corporate criminal liability for specific intent crimes as well as offenses of criminal
negligence should be imposed in Texas.
129. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416 (1978); Note, Corporate
Homicide.- A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 911, 921

(1979) (punishment of fines reduces corporation's financial gain from illegal conduct).
130. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 416 (1978).
131. See Vaughan & Sons v. State, 649 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. App.-Texarkana

1983, pet. granted).
132. See id at 677.
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